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den Gendzel

PoHtical _Culture: Genealogy ofa Concept
Self-Rule: A Cultural History ofAmerican Democracy. By Robert H. Wiebe
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995) 321 pp. $29.95
The Emerging Midwest: Upland Southerners and the Political Culture
of the Old Northwest. By Nicole Etcheson (Bloomington, Indiana
University Press, 1996) 205 pp. $39.95
A cursory glance at new titles in U.S. political history may give
the impression that "all the past is political culture," and that this
intuitively sensible formula is "casually invoked" by writers casting
about for theoretical support. Admittedly, some users have turned
political culture into an elastic category. The Encyclopedia ofAmeri
,can Social History, for example, expansively claims political culture
for both the "new social history" and the ~'new political history."
A recent survey of the Organization of American Historians finds
that nine ofthe top ten "mo~t influential" books can be considered
"inquiries into the nature of American political culture," even
though none of these classic works_ever invoked the concept by
name. Political culture might be an example of what Thompson
called "a clumpish term, which by gathering so many activities
and attributes into one common bundle may actually confuse or
disguise discriminations that should be made between them:"
Absent a clear definition and intellectual genealogy, "political
culture" threatens to obscure more than it reveals. 1
Glen Gendzel is a Ph.D. candidate, Department ofHistory, University 9fWisconsin, Madison .
He is the author of "Competitive Bqpsteris~: How Milwaukee Lost the Braves," Business
History Rniftv, xux (1995), sJo-s66.
C 1997 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the editors of The journal of
lntndisciplinary History.
1 Jean H. Baker, "And All the Past is Political Culture," Reviews in Amniuln History, XV
(1987), s9-6s; David Farber, "Political Culture and the Therapeutic Ideal, " Reviews in Ammcan
History, XXIII (1995), 681; Peter N . Steams, "The Old Social History and the New," in
Mary Kupiec Cayton, Elliot J. Gom, and Peter W. Williams (eds.), Encyclopedia of American
.........'"" (New York , 1993), I, 238; Robert Kelley, ..Political Culture," in ibid., fll,
Thomas Bender, "'Venturesome and Cautious': American History in the 19905,"
joui'PIIIl of Amnican History, LXXXI (1994), 995-996. referring to David Thelen, "The Practice
of American History," ibid., 953; Edward P. Thompson, Customs in Common (New York,

1991), 1].
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Despite this danger, historians should not turn their backs on
political culture. Recent works like Etcheson's Emerging Midwest
suggest that the concept possesses great analytical utility. Others
like Wiebe's Self-Rule, however, underscore the need for more
discipline· in using it. Beyond casual invocation, historians of
political culture would. do well to acquaint themselves with the
intellectual genealogy of the concept-not least because it teaches
a rare lesson in how to make theoretical contributions to other
disciplines. Political culture originated as an analytical tool for
political scientists using quantitative-behavioralist methods, but
historians have so enriched the concept with theories of cultural
interpretation that now "one can see gro\,lnds for reborrowing by
political scientists of the concept originally borrowed from them."
There is nothing new about historians pilfering ideas, but, in this
insta11-ce, historians are not exporters of a precious theoretical
commodity, gaining unaccustomed leverage in the interdiscipli
nary balance of trade. Furthermore, while political scientists have
come to accept that historically derived "cultural beliefS," not just
systemic "variables," affect political outcom historians have es
tablished that the intersection of politics an culture was a vital
part of the American past. 2
The concept of political culture evolved from centuries of gen
eralizing about power's different faces in different places. Plato's
"dispositions," Montesquieu's "spirit of the laws," Jean-Jacques
Rousse~u's "mores," David Hume's "manners," Alexis de Toc
queville's "habits of the heart," Emile Durkheim's "collective con
sciousness," and Max Weber's "authority systems" were all
ancestors to the concept. Earlier in this century, American social
scientists began asking how the unique "psychological coherence"
or "modal personality" of a culture might affect its politics.
Laswell s call for "extend[ing) the scope of political investigation
to include the fundamental features of the cultural setting" helped
loose a flood ofso-called "national character." studies in the 1 940s.
These works placed whole countries on the couch, linking sup
posedly essential traits to the resolution of collective psycho
7

2 Stephen Welch, The Conapt of Political Culture (New York, 1993), 148; Lawrence C.
Dodd and Calvin Jillson (eds.), Th~ Dyrulmics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations
(Boulder, 1994), 2. See also Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, CJ4ltr4ral
Theory (Boulder, 1991).
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d
. The resulting neo-Freudian interpretations of culture
were imaginative and often frivolous, such as the theory of
"diaperology" that ascribed Soviet foreign policy to Russian swad
dling practices. At best, national character studies lapsed into
hereditarian determinism; at worst, they reified crude stereotypes.
Political scientists concluded from this early misadventure that
cultural theory must rely on "observations systematically made and
recorded by trained social scientists" armed with the rigorously
empirical methods of quantitative behavioralism. 3
The modem-day concept of political culture was born amid
Cold War efforts to distinguish the "Free World" from · the rest
of the world. In a landmark 1956 essay, Aimond contrasted the
"pragmatic" politics of Britain and the United State'S with the
"simplism" of totalitarian states. This Manichean dichotomy ap
pealed to postwar political scientists who hoped that comparative
theory would help spread the blessings of American democracy
and stem the tide of communism. But Almond's research agenda
oudasted the Cold War: "Every political system is embedded in
a particular pattern oforientations to political action. I have found
it useful to refer to this as the political culture." With this single
stroke, he offered a convenient catchphrase for such loosely con
ceptualized termS in comparative politics as attitudes, values, ideol
ogy, and socialization. It bore an obvious affinity to Weber's
recendy translated theory of Protestantism as the cultural engine
of modernization. The problem for political scientists was how to
J Harry Eckstein, ..A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present," in idm1 and
David E. Apter (eds.), Comparati~ Politics: A I«adn (New York, 1963); Gabriel A. Almond,
"'The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in itkrn arid Sidney Verba (eds.),
Tltt Civic Cul~~nr RMsikd (Boston, 198o); Glenda M. Patrick, ..Political C ulture," in Giovanni
Sartori (ed.), Soci4l Sdma Corrupts: A Systmuttic Analysis (Beverly Hills, 1984); Abram
Kardiner, 1M ltulil1illu4/ and His Sociny (New York, 1939); Ralph Linton, TM Cultural
Badtgroutul tf Prrsotwlity (New York, 1945); Harold D. Lasswell, World Politics and Pmonal
lriSMirity (New York. •96s; orig. pub. 19JS), I s8; Geoffrey Gorer, "National Character:
Theory and Practice," in Margaret Mead and Rhoda Metraux (eds.>', Tht Study of Culture at
a Dis14111a (Chicago, 1953); Mead, "National Character," in Alfred L. Kroeber (ed.), Anthro
pology Tod4y: An Etrcydoptdit ln~tory (Chicago, T9SJ); Mead, And Kttp Your Powdtr Dry:
An Antlwpologist I..oolts at Amtric4l (New York, 1942); Ruth Benedict, TM Chrysanthnnum
and tltt Sword: Pattmts tf.J4ptmnt Culture (Boston, 1946); Gorer, TM Amtricdn Proplt: A Study
in NatUmlll Clwatttr (New York, 1948); itkrn and John Rickman, Tltt Pfoplt tf Grrat Russia
(London, 1949); Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses About Political Acts, " World
Politics, I (1948), 102.n; Alex lnkeles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study
of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems,". in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson
(eds.), Tltt Handboolr of Soci4l Psychology (Reading, Mass., 1969; 2.d ed.), IV.
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apply ·Almond's idea-how to identify, measure, and compare the
"pattern of orientations" that characterized politics in different
nations. The solution came from another field of postwar political
science, namely, psephology, or the study of voting behavior.4
Psephologists at the time were busily using the sample-survey
methods of opinion pollsters and market researchers to explore
"how the voter makes up . his mind." Inspired by this work,
regarded at the time as methodologically sophisticated, Almond
teamed with Verba to survey thousands of citizens in five nations.
In The Civic Culture (1963}, Almond and Verba vowed to develop
"a scientific theory of democracy" by "codify[ing] the operating
characteristics of the democratic polity itself." In prac.tice, how
ever, they simply measured "attitudes toward the political system,
in various places and called the result political culture. The authors
made startling discoveries-for example, that 8 5 percent ofAmeri
cans expressed pride in their government, compared with 7 per
cent of Germans and 3 percent of Italians. But critics questioned
the "psychologically reductionistic" use of poll data to sum up
individual attitudes, given that culture was a group phenomenon,
protesting that "political culture [was] the prope~ of a collectiv
ity." "Individuals have beliefs, values, and attitudes, but they do
not have cultures." Evidently, there was a difference between
answering questionnaires, which reflected diffuse opinions, and
constituting a polity, which reflectS" historical evolution, intersub
jective understanding, and collectively negotiated (and contested)
meanings. 5
4 Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, XVIII (1956), 31~409 ;
Terence Ball, "American Political Science in Its Postwar Political Context," in James Farrand
Raymond Seidelman (eds.), Discipline and History: Political Sdma in the United States (Ann
Arbor; 1993); Almond. "Comparative Political Systems," 96; Weber (trans. Talcott Parsons),
TM Prottstllnt Ethic and tM Spirit of Capitalism (New York, 1958). The tenn "political culture"
appeared earlier in Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, Soviet Communism: A New Civiliz ation?
(New York. 1936).
5 Paul F. Lazanttid, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice: How the Voter
Mmm Up His MiNI in a Prtsidmti41 Campt~ign (New York, 1944); Berelson, Lazenfeld, and
William N . McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campt~ign (Chicago,
I9So4); ~Campbell, Philip E. Convene, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The
Amtrica Votn (New York. 1C)6o); Almond and Verba, The ' Civic Culture: Political Attitudes
lltld Dtmoaacy in Fiw Nations (Princeton, I96J), u , s. IJ, 102. On the methodological context,
see Carnpbdl and George Katona, "The Sample Survey: A Technique for Social Science
Research," in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (eds.), Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences
(New York, I9SJ). Lowell Dittmer, "The Comparative Analysis of Political Culture," Amni
lwtudim, XXVII (1982), 20; David). Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search
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Almond and Verba had completely omitted history and poli
tics from their construction of political culture. They presumed
that .polls measure timeless cultural attributes; instead, they may
simply record ephemeral opinions about a particular regime at a
particular time. Almond and Verba seemed to imply that political
culture never changed and never varied . internally. Marxists ob
jected that The Civic Culture ignored class and power relations,
and many detractors raised the red flag of normative bias: Almond
and Verba seemed to idealize the "moderate" civic culture of
Anglo-American liberal democracy that other benighted countries
' lacked. 6
The worst flaw in the original political culture concept was
its chicken-egg conundrum of cause and effect: Did civic culture
create democracy-or did democracy create civic culture? As an
explanatory model, political culture seemed tautological; structure
rather than culture could well account for democratic success,
rendering the civic culture just another dependent variable. Potter
had earlier suggested, an alternative explanation that American
democracy was rooted not in civic culture but in economic
"abundance." Almond later showed signs of agreeing with him.7
Before long, Verba admitted to having written "a bold and
incautious book." He redefined political culture as "beliefS, ex
pressive symbols, and values" that required interpretation as well
as measurement. He tried to be more specific about "what aspects
of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparatiw Politics, XI (1979}, 129.
See also Louis J. Cantori, "Post-Behavioral Political Science and the Study of Comparative
Politics," in idnn and Andrew H. Zeifer, Jr. (eds.), Comparative Politics in the Post-Btluwioral
Era (Boulder, 1988); Mattei Dogan, "Use and Misuse ofStatistics in Comparative Research,"
in idnn and Ali Zazancigil (eds.), Comparing Nations: Conapts, Strakgi~s, Substana (Word,
1994).
6 Carole Pateman, "Political Culture, Political Structure, and Political Change," British
JournAl Dj Political Scima, I (1971}, 2.91-305; Jerzy Wiatt, "The Civic Cui!Ufe from a Marxist
Sociological Perspective," in Almond and Verba (eds.), Civic Culturt RMsikd, IOJ-12J ;
Ronald H. Chilccxe, Theorin ofOmrparatiw Politics (Boulder, 1994; zd ed.}, 183- 186; Young
C . Kim, "The Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics, "Journal Dj Politics, XXVI
(1
, 313-364; Edward Lehman, "On the Concept of Political Culture: A Theoretical
R
ent," Soci4J Ftwas, L (1972.), 361-370.
7
ateman, -rhe Civic Culture: A Philosophical Critique, " in Almond and Verba (eds.),
Civic CultNrt Rnisikd, 57-102; Arend Lijphart, "The Structure of Inference," in ibid., n - s6;
Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Selip>n. "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question
of Causal Relationships," Alfltrican Political Scinta &Ww, LX.XXVIIJ (1994), 6Js~sz; David
Potter, Ptopk Dj Plmty: Economic Abundana and Amnican Charactn (Chicago, 1954); Almond,
"Capitalism and Democracy, " PS: Politiml Scima and Politics, XXIV (1991), 467-474.
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of political culture are determinants of what phenomena," repo
sitioning the concept as the "link between the events of politics
and the behavior of individuals." Verba allowed for cultural
changes that could shape or be shaped by politics, for class-specific
versions of a culture, and for subcultures within a polity. In a
volume dedicated to Almond, he offered his "broad and rather
loose definition" to answer their critics, and Pye, his new collabo
rator, soon followed with a similarly inclusive definition that
stretched political culture from "the collective history of a political
system" to ''the life histories of the members of that system,"
creating a link between "public events and private experiences."
Thus, the political culture concept acquired its "kitchen sink"
reputation, eliciting criticism that it described everything about
politics "without explaining anything" and turned "abstract ide
alizations" into uncaused causes. Dissatisfied political scientists
implored their colleagues to "stop using political culture as a handy
residual variable to explain phenomena we cannot think of other
ways to deal with. •>S
Political culture's wash-out left comparative politics in what
Wiarda called "a state of crisis," woefully lacking "a single global
and integrating theoretical framework." Accordin,g to Laitin, "The
systematic study of politics and culture [was] m<fribund. "9
The underappreciated concept emerged again in another
branch of the political-science family, the study of American
government. Patterson suggested treating regions of the United
States as mini-nations with distinct political cultures, and Elazar
soon emerged as the leader of this project. For him, political
8 Verba, "On Revisiting The Civic Culture: A Personal Postscript, " in Almond and idem
(eds.), Cillic Culture &visited, 394; idem, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye
and idnn (eds.}, Political Culture and PolitiCJJI Dn!elopment (Princeton, 1965}, 513-518; Pye,
"Politital Culture," in David L. Sills (ed.}, lntmratiorud Encydopedia of the Social Sciences (New
York, 1968), XII, 218; Louis Schneider, "Some Disgruntled and Controversial Comments on
the Idea ofCulture in the Social Sciences," Social Sdena Quarterly, Llll (1972), 378; Robert
C. Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society," PolitiCJJl Sdena Quartnly,
LXXXVIII (197J), 179; Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics, 9; Ruth Lane, "Political
Culture: Residual Category or General Theory?" Comparative PolitiCJJl Studies, XXV (1992),
364.

9 Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), N~ Diredions in Comparative Politics (Boulder, 1985), xi-xii;
David D. ~tin, ~and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yornba (Chicago,
1986), 171. See also Alasdair Macintyre, "Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?" in
Peter Laslett, Walter G. Runciman, and Quentin Skinner (eds.}, Philosophy, Politics and Society
(Oxford, 1972).
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culture comprised the "habits, perspectives, and attitudes that exist
to influence political life"; regional variations in political forms
resulted directly from "differences in political culture among the
states." Elazar theorized that the arrival and spread ofEuro-Ameri
can civilization across the United States from east to west left a
residual pattern. He isolated and identified the "moralistic" culture
ofNew England, the "individualistic" culture of the Mid-Atlantic
region, and the "traditionalistic" culture of the South. These
Ur-cultures migrated to the "continuing frontier" of the West,
then to the cities, and finally to the suburbs. Elazar applied
"cultural geology" to the sediments of human society that these
migration streams left behind, devising intricate maps of each
culture's national diffusion. 10
Few political scientists found Elazar's "American mosaic"
completely persuasive. Some · rejected his triangular typology in
favor ofa continuum, but none could agree on which two cultures
were polar opposites. Some disputed Elazar's terms because his
categories entailed a type of belief (individualism), a manner of
belief (traditionalism), and a source of belief (111oralism), which
made them incommensurable. Elazar devoted considerable effort
to refine these cultural constructs, never backing down from what
he considered "the soundness of [his] original thesis." Eventually,
he inflated it into a grand theory of "the actual way in whi~h the
art of government is practiced" throughout the United States,
even insisting that political culture, "an independent variable with
a dynamic of its own," had caused the Civil War. 11
Stirred by such extravagant claims, swarms ofdoubting schol
ars tested Elazar's cultural constructs against such quantitative
state-level variables as voter turnout, tax rates, per capita spending,
quality of life, and poll "data of all kinds. The results proved
10 Samuel C. Patterson, lhe Politial Cultures of the American States," joumal of Politics,
XXX (1968), 187-209; Daniel J. Elazar, Ammcan Ft!dnalism: A View From tht! Stdtt!s (New
York. 1972; ul ed.), 8s, 89, 93-127.
•
11 Ira Sharkansky, Jhe Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: A Research Note, " Polity, II
(1969), 6lr83; Frederick Win, "Does Control FoUow the Dollar? Value Analysis, School
Policy, and State-Local Linkages, " Publiws, X (1980), ~88 ; Ellis, Amtrialn Political Culturu ·
York. 1993), r6s-r69; Elazar, ..Afterword: Steps in the Study of American' Political
"Publitu, X (1980), 127; idem, Tht! Amtrican Mosaic: Tht! Impact of Spaa, Time, and
Culture em Ammcm. Politics (Boulder, 1994), 219, u; idem, Building TOUidrd Civil War:
Gmnatiorual Rhythms in .Amerian Politics (Lanham, Md., 1992), 193- 197. See also idem, Citia
of tht! Praim: TM Mmopolitan Frontier and American Politics (New York, 1990).
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inconclusive. "For every study that claims to have found Elazar's
theory vindicated," one survey of this literature observed, "there
is another that claims to find it of little use. " 12
After a much-heralded birth, the political culture concept had
mutated into an awkward and unloved scion of political science.
"Doubts about the approach no doubt arose from its tab-quick
popularity, its rapidly ·acquired faddishness," reasoned Eckstein,
and a recent textbook stated, "Rarely has a concept been so
frequently used and so often contended." Most users had to
refashion the notion to suit themselves--either employing survey
data to suggest changes in political culture between ge~ations,
thereby sidestepping questions of causality or attitudinal"~ribu
tion, or whittling down the concept into a humble "heuristic
device" merely to set boundaries for political outcomes. At best,
culture influenced "preferences" by demarcating the range of
conceivable alternatives without choosing among them. Too
often, however, "political culture" served as an academic token
or a bland cliche. For example, Elazar's friends and foes alike could
hardly have disagreed that, in the name of political culture, "the
political attitudes of U.S. citizens vary in important ways on the
basis of where in the United States they live." ith this sort of
commonplace wisdom, political culture betrayed its early promise
as the "scientific theory of democracy. "13
After political scientists abandoned· the political culture concept,
historians gave it a new home. Political scientists had tried to
12 M. Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, Cultural Theory, 242. See also John Kincaid ,
"Dimensions and Effects of America's Political Subcultures," ]ourMI of American Culture, V
(1982), 84--92; Jody L. Fitzpatrick and Rodney E. Hero, "Political Culture and Political
Characteristics of the American States: A Consideration of Some Old and New Questions,"
Westmt Political Qu4rtnly, XLI (1988), 145-153.
13 Eckstein, l«gdrding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change (Berkeley,
1992), 286; Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller, "A Renaissance of Political Culture?"
Amman ]ounuJI of Political Scima, XL (1996), 632-659; Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy,
Ht1W to Compart N ations: Strategies in Compdrati&IC! Politics (Chatham, NJ., 1990; 2d ed.), 68;
Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase, Political Attion: Mass Participdtion in Five Western Demoaacies
(Beverly Hills, 1979); Inglehart, The Silmt Rnolution: Clumging Values and Political Style Among
Westmt Puljics (Princeton, 1977); idem, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton,
1990); Wildavsky, ' Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of
Preference Fonnation," Amman Political Sciena Review, LXXXI (1987), 3- 21; Eckstein, "A
Culturalist Theory ofPolitical Change," ibid., LXXXII (1988), 789-804; Roben S. Erikson,
John P. Mciver, and Gerald C. Wright, Jr., "State Political Culture and Public Opinion, "
ibid., LXXXI, 813 .
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observe, dissect, classify, and quantify culture, but U.S. rustorians
absorbed a more holistic view of it from postwar anthropologists.
Beyond arts and literature, culture came to encompass the "com
plex whole" of social organization~piritual belief, political
institution, traditional practice, ethical value, psychological as
sumption, folkloric custom, popular entertainment, gender roles,
material artifacts, and myriad other kaleidoscopic concerns. In
deed, anthropologists argued among themselves about the "con
ceptual slovenliness" that plagued their "inordinately swollen"
construct. Most, however, accepted that the broader definition of
culture was "a source of illumination, not a veil of obscurity." As
Berkhofer pointed out, both the postwar American Studies move
ment and what later drew scorn as "consensus" history resulted
from similar efforts to trace "manifestations ofbehavior" to cultural
"ideas and values" in anthropological fashion. 14
The temptation to quantify culture seduced relatively few
rustorians, because their subjects, being for the most part dead,
could not fill out questionnaires. Instead, rustorians immersed
themselves in texts and applied · (or misapplied) anthropological
theory as best they could. Many became devotees of Geertz,
whose ethnographic method of "truck description" sought to
inscribe words and deeds with phenomenological and contextual
meaning. Truck description entranced those who already believed
with Skinner that "the explanation of human action must always
include--and perhaps even take the form of--an attempt to
recover and interpret the meanings ofsocial actions from the point
of view of the agents performing them." In a Weberian para
Alfred L. K.roeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culturt: A Critical .RMN of Concepts and
(Cambridge, Mass., 1952); Milton Singer, '"The Concept ofCulture," in Sills (ed.},
lntmt4tiotUII Encyclopedia of 1M Social Sdmas, Ill, 527-543; Roger M. Keesing, wrheories of
Culture," Annual RnMw of Anthropology, Ill (1974), 73-97; Ward H. Goodenough, "Culture,"
in Levinson and Melvin Ember (eds.), Encyd~dia of Cultural Anthropology (New York, 199()),
14

~nitions

I, 291-297; Schnrider, "Some Disgrunded and Controversial Comments, " 377, 378; Robert
me, ..Properties ofCulture: An Ethnographic View," in Richard A. Shweder and idml
C.Jturt TMory: Essays on Mind, SdJ, and Emotion (New York, 1984), 67. See also Sherry
B. Ortner, -rheory in Anthropology Since the Sixties, " Comparativr Studin in Sonny and
History, XXVI (1984), 126-166, and the responses in ibid., XXVIII (1986), 356-374. Robert
F. Berkhofer, Jr., "Clio and the Culture Concept: Some Impressions of a Changing Rela
tionship in American Historiography," Social Sdnra Qwlrtnly, Llll (1972), 299. See also
Richard E. Sykes, "Americm Studies and the Concept of Culture: A Theory and Method, "
Amnium Qu4rtnly, XV '(1963), .253-270; Brian Attebery, "American Studies: A Not So
Scientific Method," Amnican Qu4rtnly, XLVIII (1996), 316-343.
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phrase, Geertz postulated that "man is an animal suspended in
webs of significance he himself has spun," thus declaring that the
study of homo signifoans required impressionistic interpretation, not
scientific measurement. Focusing on the intersubjective aspects of
public acts, thick description' became a technique of cultural
semiotics, or the contextual interpretation ofcultural symbols. With
it, historians wOVId breathe new life into the political culture
concept. Historiographical surveys of Geertz's influence tend to
focus on European cultural historians, but his impact on American
political historians was no less impressive. 15
On the surface, cultural semiotics seemed incompatible with
history because it ignored the origin and evolution of cultural
symbols. As Biersack put it, in cultural semiotics, "Meaning is
described, never derived." European historians inclined toward
Foucault's style of locating symbols (or "representations') in his
tory rather than Geertz's penchant for ahistoricai description. But
many political historians in the United States embraced cultural
semiotics in the I 970s because it promised to liberate them from
the theoretical legacies ofmaterialism, behavioralism, and idealism,
which had paralyzed the study ofideology. For de des, materialist
historians had treated ideology as a rationalization of material
interest or an outright obfuscation; behavioralists had treated it as
idiosyncratic, hopelessly subjective, and irrelevant; and idealists
had treated it as disembodied "thought" with a life of its own, at
least until the "linguistic tum" enshrined a less transcendental view
of abstract discourse. Many political historians agreed with Hartz
that the materialist-ide~st schism distorted ideology's role in
history by rendering ideas either epiphenomenal or overly deter
ministic. Many also agreed with such linguistic philosophers as
1 s Some anthropologists take a dim view of these efforts; some historians concm. See the
symposium, "History and Anthropology: A Dialogue," Historiull Methods, XIX (1986), 1 19
128; Jean- Christophe Agnew, "History and Anthropology: Scenes from a Marriage," Yale.
jolml41 of Criticism, Ill (1990), 29-50; Nicholas B. Dirks, "Is Vice Versa? Historical Anthro
pologies and Anthropological Histories," in Terrence J. McDonald (ed.), The Historic Tum in
tM Himkm Scintm (Ann Arbor, 1996), I?-SI; Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures:
Sdetted Essafs (N~ Yo rk, 1973), esp. 3-30; Skinner (ed.), The Return of Grand Theory in the
Hu1P1411 Scimas (New York, 1985), 6. See also Kenneth A. Rice, Gmtz and Culture (Ann
Arbor, 1980); Nigel Rapport, "Thick Description," in Levinson and Ember (eds.), Encyclopedi4
·of Cultural Andwpology, IV, 1311-1313 . Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, s. See also Ronald
G . Walters, "Signs of the Times: Clifford Geertz and Historians," Social Research, XLVII (1980),
537-556; Lynn Hunt, "History Beyond Social Theory, " in David Carroll (ed.) , The States of
'Theory ": History, Art, and CritUal Discourse (New York, 1990).
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Austin that b~havioralism either ignored the possibility of "doing
things with words" or oversimplified human behavior by dJsmiss
ing intentionality. 16
Geertz deftly fused ideas, interests, and behavior by treating
ideology as a socially co~structed "cultural system." Ideology, in
his view, affected how people perceived and acted on their ma
terial int_erests; it also shaped political ideas with unspoken assump
tions that guided behavior. Geertz stressed that ideology was the
overall context of ''events, behaviors, institutions, or processes,"
rather than the cause (as idealists assumed) or the effect (as mate
rialists and behavioralists assumed) of social phenomena-includ
ing politics. The cultural context of politics encompassed
perception of interest, intention for behavior, and assumption
behind idea. It inscribed the words and deeds of participants with
culturally symbolic meanings that analysts endeavored to decipher.
Of course, historians had to keep in mind "that symbols convey
multiple meanings and that meaning is construed in different ways
by different people," as Damton cautioned aspiring Geertzians.
But the discovery of cultural semiotics helped American historians
cultivate a renewed appreciation for the symbolic forms of poli
tics--discourse and practice, voting and speaking, campaigning
and governing. Political words and deeds became symbolic texts
susceptible to interpretation for meanings intended by communi
cators, constructed by audiences, and (though Geertz was weak
on this point) contested by subaltern groups. 17
Aletta Biersack, ..Local Knowledge, Local History: Geertz and Beyond," in Hunt (ed.),
Cultural History (Berkeley, 1989), 8o. See also IUren Lystr.a, ..Clifford Geertz and
the Concept ofCulture," Prospms, VIII (1983), 31-47; Eric Kline Silverman, "Clifford Geertz:
Towards a More •Thick' Undemanding?" in Christopher Tilley (ed.), ReaJing MakrUII
Culturr: Slructuralism, Hnmmeutics and Post-Siruauralism (Oxford, 1990), 143-145; Peter'
Clarke, "Ideas and Interests," in Theodore K. Rabb and Robert I. Rotberg (eds.), The N~
History: The 1980s arul &yond (Princeton, 1982.); Myron J . Aronoff, "Ideology and Interest:
The Dialectics of Politics," Politiall Anthropology, I (1980), 1-2.9; John E. Toews, "lnteUectual
History after the Linguistic Tum: The Autonomy of Meaning and the Irreducibility of ,
E~e," Amnican Historiall RM~, XCII (1987), 879-907; Louis Hanz, "The Problem
o~ticalldeas," in Roland Young (ed.), A~ to the Study of Politics (Evanston, 1958);
John L. Austin, H(IUI to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, Mass., 1962.); John Searle, Sp«df
Acts: An Esuy in 1M Philosophy of~ (Cambridge, Mass., 1969); Skinner, "On Perform
ing and Explaining Linguistic Actions," PllilosopltKal Qtuntnly, XXI (1971), 1-2.1.
17 Geertz, lrtlnptrtllliDfl cf Cultum, 193-2.2.9, 14; Robert Damton, The Kiss of Lmwurrtte:
RrjfedUms 011 Cultural History (New York, 1990), 330. See also M. Margaret Conway, ..The
Political Context of PolitiCal Behavior," Journal of Politics, Ll (1989), 3- 10.
16
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Cultural semiotics allowed historians to describe political ide
ology without transmuting it into idealist "thought," exaggerating
it into "hegemony," ·or reducing it to "false consciousness." When
assessed symbolically, politics became as much a part of culture as
gender · or religion---social constructions that historians routinely
subjected to symbolic interpretations. This approach appealeo to
political historians who recognized that elitist biographies were
.Passe, but whom its successor, the "new political history," failed
to satisfy. As confirmed behavioralists, the new political historians
downplayed "rhetoric" as deceptive, meaningless, and anecdotal.
Instead, they correlated votirig and census data to build determinist
models of political action based on "ethnocultural" loyalty. These
historians stripped objective behavior from subjective context,
treating voters in poll booths like laboratory rats in mazes; with
a wave of the slide rule, they dismissed ideology as irrelevant to
"how democracy works." Cultural semiotics attracted instead
those historians of politics who agreed that old-fashioned ap
proaches merely skimmed the surface, but who rejected both the
old Marxian-materialist and the new ethnocultural-behavioralist
alternatives. Surely there was more to politics than class conflict
and correlation coefficients. Armed with Geertz's expansive
definition of ideology, which shifted his~orical attention to the
symbolic content of campaign rallies, platform atory, and po
litical tracts, historians could redeem political culture while doing
useful work. 18
"One of the things that everyone .knows but no one can quite
think how to demonstrate," Geertz pondered, "is that a country's
politics reflect the design of its culture." With Geertz's help,
historians cut this Gordian knot by replacing the "behavioral
orthodoxy" of political science with the classic anthropological
18 Al)}n G. Bogue, "United States: The 'New' Political History, " in Walter Laqueur and
George L. Mosse (eds.), The Nnv History (New York, 1967). See also Bogue, Clio and the
Bitch Goddess: Qwmrifo.arion in American Politic41 History (Beverly Hills, 1983). Richard Jensen,
"How Democracy Works: The Linkage Between Micro and Macro Political History," joum41
of SocUJl History, XVI (1983), 31. See also J. Morgan Kousser, ''The Revivalism of Narrative:
A Response to R ecent Criticisms of Quantitative History," Social Science History, VIII (1984),
I 33- 149; Bogue, "Systematic Revisionism and a Generation offerment in American History,"
journal of Contemporary History, XXI (1986), 135- 16.2; idnn, "The Quest for Numeracy: Data
and Metho& in Atnerican Political History," joum41 of Interdisciplinary History, XXI (1990),
89-116.
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theory of culture as unarticulated consciousness-what Kluck
hohn, in 1943, had called "covert culture," which operates
through "unstated premises" rather than measurable attitudes.
Kluckhohn· defined culture as the collection of "premises and
categories whose influence is greater, rather than less, because they
are seldom put into words. "19
Tracking down the unspoken assumptions of past politics was
not a new quest. As early as the 1940s, long before the discovery
of cultural semiotics, ambitious U.S. historians were forging grand
syntheses of ideology into cultural systems. For their pains, many
of these writers were branded as "consensus" celebrators, even
though their intent was not always celebratory. Others showed
sensitivity to political symbols in the ideology of colonial Virgini
ans, early national politicians, the followers of Andrew Jackson,
and the founders of the Republican party. These early works
anticipated the political culture synthesis, but the watershed in
historical application of the political culture concept was the
discovery of republicanism as the ideology that shaped colonial
American perceptions of British rule in the imperial crisis of the
eighteenth century.20
.
For generations, historians had argued about the validity, and
even the sincerity, of complaints against British rule leading.up to
the Revolution. It seemed incongruous that a tax increase could
have provoked a general rebellion against king and country. The
reinterpretation of revolutionary discourse in light of republican
symbols and meanings helped historians to see George III's "long
19 Geenz, lnterpreltJtion of Cultures, 3 11; Kluckhohn, "Coven Culture and Administrative
Problems," American Anthropologist, XLV (1943), 218; idem, Mirror for Man: The Relation of
Anthropology to Motkm Lifo (New York, 1949), 3.5· See also Kluckhohn and William H . KeUy,
"The Concept ofCulture," in Ralph Linton (ed.), The Science of Man in the World Crisis (New
York, 194.5); LeVine, ..Properties of Culture, " 76-77.
'
20 Richard HofStadter, The American Politiclll Tradition and the Mm Who Made It (New York,
1948); Hartz, The Libnal Tradition in Amnia~: An lntnpretation of Amnia~n Political Th~mght
Since 1M Revolution (New York, 19.5.5); Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation :. The
United SIIJtfS in Historic41 and Comparatiw Pmpectiw (New York, 1963); Daniel Boorstin, The
.Amnicmu (New York, 19.58-73), 3v; Charles S. Sydnor, Amnia~n Revolutionaries in the Malting :
Politiclll Ptaaias in Washington 's Virginia (New York, 1962); Edmund S. Morgan, American
~.American Frtedom: The Ortkal of Colonial Virginia (New York. 197.5); Ho&tadter, The
Idea ofa Patty Systmt: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the U nited States, 178o-t840 (Berkeley,
· John William Ward, Andmv Jadtson : Symbol for an Age (New York, 19.5.5); Marvin
M
The }«Jtsonian Persuasion: Politics and &lief (Stanford, 19.57); Eric Foner, Free Soil,
.mt Labor, Frte Mnr: The ltkology of the RepubliCAn Party Befort the Civil War (N ew York,
1970).
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train· of abuses" from the patriots' perspective as a monstrous
conspiracy against liberty and a harbinger of corruption. Bailyn
and his students drew on cultural semiotics to stress that revolu
tionary leaders and a' great many followers perceived British policy
as "a deliberate assault launched surreptitiously by plotters against ·
liberty." Through the republican lens, American rebels "saw be
hind the actions of the English ministry . . . not merely misgov
ernment . . . but a deliberate design to destroy the constitutional
safeguards of liberty, which only concerted resistance-violent
resistance if necessary-could effectively oppose.'' Intellectual his
torians also help_e d articulate republicanism to recapture the mean
ing ofsymbol-laden words like tyranny, corruption, liberty, and virtue
in their original setting and to reinterpret the Revolution from
the revolutionaries' point of view. 21
Predictably, materialist historians denounced the republican
ism thesis as "ideological determinism.'' Failing to appreciate the
subtlety of political culture as a perceptual context and a semio
logical system, not a cause, these critics mistook republicanism for
a "consensus" theory that attributed the Revolution to the writings
of"Great White Men." Undaunted, Bailyn's students kept spread
ing the gospel of political culture, urging colleagues to recognize
that public expressions of political ideas "meant something very
real to both the writers and their readers," and that revolutionary
rhetoric deserved renewed attention for evidence of forgotten
meanings. Bailyn himself nominated Geertz as a otential media
tor for political historians divided between materialism, behav
ioralism, and idealism. "Formal discourse becomes politically
powerful when it becomes ideology," he asserted-that is, when

.

21 Bernard Bailyn, T~ Itko/ogiull Origins oft~ Amnican Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1967),
9.5; idms, "The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpretation, " in Stephen
G. Kurtz and James H . Hutson (eds.), Essays on ~ Amnican Revolution (Chapel Hill, 1973),
I 2. See also Robert E. Shalhope, "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an
Undentanding of Republicanism in American Historiography," William and Mary Quarterly,
XXIV (1972), 49-8o; idmt, "Republicanism and Early American Historiography," ibid.,
XXXIX (1982), 334-3.56; Lance Banning, "The Republican Interpretation: Retrospect and
Prospect," ~s of~ Amnican Anfiiuarian Soddy, en (1992), I.SJ-180; Caroline Rob
bins, T~ Bgltt«nth-Cmtury Commommllthlfllltl (Cambridge, Mass., 1961);john Greville Agard
Pocock, TM M«<rUawwlian Mommt: RomttiM Politic41 Thought and th~ Atlmrtic Republican
Trlldition (Princeton, 197.5); Isaac K.ramnick, Rqublicmlism and Bourg~is Radicalism: Politiall
IMology in I..Ak Eigltt«nth-Cmtury Englmrd and Amnica (Ithaca, 1990); Richard K. Mathews
(ed.), Virtw, Corruption and &lf-lntntst: Politiall Valua in ~ Eighteenth Century (Bethlehem,
1994).
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it "shapes what is otherwise instinctive and directs it to attainable
goals; when it clarifies, symbolizes, and elevates to structured
consciousness the mingled urges that stir within us." Wood,
Bailyn's student, likewise echoed Geertz in affirining that· the
"meanings~' people gave to their political actions were "never
epiphenomenal" and that "all human behavior can only be un
derstood and explained, indeed can only exist, in terms of the
meanings it has. "22
Republicanism advanced the cause of political culture with
historians, but family quarrels about the relationships between
republicanism, liberalism, and labor radicalism still had to be
settled. Accusatory footnotes abounded, as historians sought to
prove the predominance of increasingly abstract viewpoints. Tay
lor complained that the republicanism debate seemed to "describe
categories that were, at best, dimly apprehended by people in the
past," a sadly ironic outcome for political culture's historiographi
cal debut, given that the concept was supposed to reinfuse past
perspectives into the study of past politics. 23
If nothing else, the debate proved that historians, unlike
political scientists, would not demand scientific rigor from their
adopted concept. Historians refrained from flinging statistics at
each other. Despite its flaws and controversies, the republicanism
thesis successfully grafted cultural semiotics onto American politi
cal history. As Silbey put it, at least historians of republicanism
tried to describe "things that link a people together politically,
their shared values, memories, and perspectives" within a holistic
framework, and Rogers, in an otherwise critical review, cited
22 Staughton Lynd, "Tories and Neo-Whi~." Reviews in Amt'ril4n History, I (1973), 204;
Jesse Lemisch, "The American Revolution Bicentennial and the Papen ofGreat White Men,"
AHA Newskttn 9 (November 1971), 7-21. For an overview of the "Great White M~n"
critique, see Ruth H. Bloch, "Radical Whi~ Revisited: Reflections upon Bernard Bailyn's
Tlw I~ Origins oftM Amnicml Revolution," lrrtdkaaull History Newskttn 1.5 (1993), 14-22.
Bailyn, ltkologWI Origins, ix; idmr, "Central Themes," 1 1; Gordon S. Wood, "lnteUectual
History and the Social Sciences," in Higham and Conkin (eds.), N~ Dirrctions in Amt'rican
lrrtdkthull History, 32. See also Wood, "The Creative Imagination of Bernard Bailyn," in
James A. Henretta, Michael Kanunen, and Stanley N . lUtz (eds.), T~ Transfomu~tion of Early
Amtrican Hist«y (New York, 1991). '
23 Alan Taylor, ..Imperative Categories," Reviews irr American History, XIX (1991), 3.5~· For
the barest outlines of these republicanism debates, see Lance Banning, ..J dfersonian Ideology
Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic," William and Mary
~. XLIII (1986), 3-19; Joyce Appleby, Libnalism and Republicanism in tht Historical
I~ (Cambridge, 1992); Bryan D. Palmer, Dtsmtt into Discourse: TM Rtifoation of
~ arul 1M Writing of SociAl History (Philadelphia, 1990), 1o6-119.
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republicanism's "investment of language and culture with coher
ence and social power. ''24
Answering the "consensus" canard, political culture historians be
gan to refocus the .concept from the natio~ to specific groups.
Holt and Greenberg described the advent of the Civil War from
the perspective of Northern and Southern politicians-both sides
viewing themselves as defenders of republican virtue. Howe
analyzed the partisan political culture of antebellum Whigs, de
claring a Ia Geertz that "the mood, metaphors, values, and style
of Whig political attitudes mattered.'' Howe profiled prominent
politicians, not because they were "Great White Men," but be
cause they were useful informants who "would reveal the fullest
development and elaboration of Whig culture." Baker conferred
comparable attention on Pemocrats in the antebellum North,
drawing upon anthropological theory to describe partisan "tribal
rites." Like Howe, Baker relied on prominent "informants," but
her methodological breakthrough was to treat "voting as a sym
bolic demonstration," the American equivalent of Geertz's famous
Balinese cockfight that is, the essential ritual of a culture. At a
time when other political historians poured over election returns
and census manuscripts, Baker set her sights on "metaphorical
language and political iconography," asking "what voting meant
in a collective sense," rather than piling up more decontextualized
statistics. 25
Soon a great many U.S. historians adopted e political cul
ture concept as their own. Reviewers found the approach "stun
ning in its originality," for it "include(d] everyone who
participated in politics," turning historians into mass mind readers.
Political culture captured "popular belie'rs and expectations that
gave meaning to the political process and guided the conduct of
24 Joel H. Silbey, "Conclusion," in Uoyd E. Ambrosius (ed.), A Crisis of Republicanism:
Amoican Politics in IN Civil War Era (Lincoln, 1990), 129; Daniel T . Rogers, "Republicanism:
the Career of a Concept," )outn~~l of Ammcan History, LXXJX (1992), 37. For a more

sympathetic review of republicanism. see James T . Kloppenberg, "Republicanism in American
History and Historiography," ToetpUVille Rmftv, XIII (1992}, 119-136.
2.5 ~clue) F. Holt, TM Political Crisis of IN 185os (New York, 1978}; Kenneth S. Greenberg,
Mlutm and St4tnmm: TM PoliticiJI Culture ofAmmcan S/mfery (Baltimore, 198.5}; Daniel Walker
Howe, The Political Culture of IN Ammcan Whigs (Chicago, 1979), 1-2, 4; Baker, Affairs of
Patty: TM PoliticaJ Culturr of Northnn Dmtoaats in tM Mid-Nineteenth Century (Ithaca, 1983),
11-12, 262-263. On the Balinese cockfight, see Geertz, lntnprrtation of Cultures, 412-4.53.
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politics and government." With this concept, historians could
recover the "manners," "intellectual atmosphere," and "percep
tions" of past political figures, though temporal . change did not
enter into their analyses until Watson chose the transition from
the first to the second party system to link economic development
to shifts in antebellum political culture. "In the process, he dem
onstrated that the retrieval of submerged patterns of belief need
not entail ·any presumptions of immutability. Formisano examined
the same transition more thoroughly, describing how genteel
"electioneering" gave way to rough-and-tumble "campaigning"
in Massachusetts. He unearthed "the taken-for-granteds" of po
litical discourse by combining sources about "community life"
with statistical analysis-but without inferring ideas from be
havior.26
.
In the 1990s, Ethington's account ofSan Francisco's shift from
"republican liberalism" to "pluralist liberalism" arid Bond's tracking
of white Mississippi's "social ethic" have ·added sophisticated dia
chronic analysis to political culture history. In this spirit, Wiebe's
Self-Rule offers a sweeping narrative of the transition from active,
high-turnout democracy in the nineteenth-century United States
to passive, low-turnout democracy in the twentieth century.
Women and non-whites were proscribed from politics, Wiebe
freely admits, but for the white-male masses, the nineteenth cen
tury was a democratic golden · age of "self-determination" when
"people ruled themselves" both individually and collectively. 27
This edenic era ended with the urban-industrial transforma
tion that brought "centralization and hierarchy." In the early
twentieth century, a new "national class" of reformers, business
men, and intellectuals wielded scientific expertise .to isolate po

.

Holt, ..Political Culture and Political Legitimacy," Reviews in Amnican History, XI (1983) ,
527; Richard L. McConnick, The Party Prriod and Public Policy: Amnican Politics from the Agt
of]acltson to 1M PrPgrrssivt Era (New York, 1986), 116; Sean Wilentz, "Whig\ and Bankers,"
Reviews in Amnican History, VIII (198o), 349; Harry L. Watson, jacksonian Poliiics and Com
munity Corsjlia: The Emngma of tht Second Amnican Party Systtm in Cumbtrl4nd County, North
CarolituJ (Baton Rouge, 1981); idem, Libmy and Pown: The Politics of]adtsonian Amnica (New
York, 1990); Ronald P. Fonnisano, The Transfontu~tion of Political Culturr: Mass«husetts Parties,
17t}Or l840s (New York, 1983), 22, 20. See also idnn, "Deferential-Participant Politics: The
Early Republic's Political Culture, 178~1840," Ainnican Politial Scima Rtvinv, LXVIII
26

(1974). 473- 487.
27 Philip J. Ethington, The Public City: The Political Construction of UriNm Lift in San Francisco,
185~1900 (New York. 1994); Bradley G. Bond, Political Culturr in the NinttmJth -Cmtury
"'
South, 18]0-I,OO (Baton Rouge, 1995); Wiebe, St!f-Rult, 9, 39.

•

2,P

GLEN GENDZEL

litical power from the masses. Wiebe charges the progressive ·
movement with the crime of "atomizing the electorate "-forcing
voters to abandon partisan identities in order to cast their ballots
as "an individualized private act." No ionger did elections function
as fraternal celebrations of shared identity. Mter I 920, faced with
the necessity of "ab~orbing increasing amounts of information on
a multiplying array of issues," fewer and fewer Americans straggled
to the polls, and voter turnout fell from over So percent in the
28
I 88os to barely 50 percent a century later.
Wiebe tells a familiar story with two new twists. First,
where;15 some historians argue that the "decline of popular poli
tics" was an unintended consequence of reform, Wiebe is less
charitable. "If most progressives did not set out to keep the poor
from the polls," he writes with scorn, "they had little invested in
bringing them there." Elitist reformers "tolerated lower-class ex
clusion" if they did not actively seek it. In this respect, Self-Rule
is a sequel to Wiebe's acclaimed classic, The Search for Order,
1877-1920, because it extendS to the present his saga of centralized
bureaucracy displacing popular self-government. In both works,
however, Wiebe seems to romanticize blind party loyalty, bossism,
and corrupt political machines because they, at least, yielded high
turnouts. He might have devoted more attention to the differ
ence between genuine "self-rule" and its illusion under boss rule,
or to the democratic potential of the rational, non-partisan, issue
oriented politics that progressives hoped to create. But Wiebe
doubts that voters need to know much about issues: "Even if we
accept the implausible proposition that a determinate body of
knowledge lies out there to be learned," he writes, "why should
citizens be obliged to sit there and learn it?" Given this attitude,
it is not surprising th~t Wiebe finds nineteenth- ntury elections,
which Henry George called "glittering displays of partisanship,"
more compelling than the bland information-overload of modem
campaigns. 29
·

28 Wiebe, ibid., 253, 13fr137, 17fr177, ~~passim.
29 Michael E. McGerr, The Dedint of Pr1pular Politics: Th~ American North, 1865-1928 (New
York. 1986); James Wright, The Progrwivr Yan~s: Rqublican &formers in Nnu Hampshire,
1~1916 (Hanover, 1987); John F. Reynolds, T~sting Dmwaacy: Elmora/ &havior and
Progrwivr Rlform in New ]mey, 1~1920 (Chapel Hill, 1988); Wiebe, &lf-Rul~, 164, 261 ;
idnn, The Searchfor Ortln, 1877- 1920 (New York, 1967); Henry George, "Money in Elections, "
North Amnican Rninu, CXXXVI (~rch 1883), 209.
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The second new twist to Wiebe's "cultural history of Ameri
. can democracy" is his pointed invocation of "culture." Sounding
like a comparative politics scholar in the Almond-Verba tradition,
Wiebe defines democracy as "invariably popular self-government
and variably something else--something culturally specific that
has adhered to it." Sounding like a Geertzian ethnographer, he
wants to explore "the webbing of values and relations" spun
within American democracy. Seemingly a culturalist, not a be
havioralist, Wiebe declares that "my study is situated at the inter
section b.etween beliefs and actions," steering between "a
systematic history of ideas on one .side and a detailed history of
political behavior on the other." Yet, except for brief forays into
exposing sundry political theorists as closeted anti-democrats,
Wiebe does not engage the rhetorical conventions, unspoken
assumptions, and significant symbols of past politics as would a
true student of cultural semiotics. Although Self-Rule is a power
fully argued brief for democratic revitalization, its invocation of
political culture terminology seems gratuitous. Despite claims to
the contrary, Wiebe's real concern is behavioralist, not culturalist:
voter turnout, not the meanings and discourse of politics, is for
him the measure of democracy. "At some point on a curve of
declining turnouts," he writes, "the system no longer functions."
Indeed, he dismisses Almond and Verba's theory of political cul
ture precisely because it ignores issues of voting behavior and
turnout. 30
Other historians combining chronological narratives with
cultural comparisons have applied the political culture concept to
symbols and ideology rather than to functions and behaviors. This
approach seems to hold the most promise for scholarly exploration
of political culture. Two decades ago, Kelley helped point the
way by retracing the transmigration of social groups between the
Jeffersonian/Democratic and Whig/Republican party coalitions.
Freeman later offered a more ideologically oriented comparison
of the styles, traditions, and worldviews of the two major parties.
More recendy, Baker, Sklar, and McCurry have produced major
studies of women's political culture in the nineteenth- and *rly
twentieth-century United States, emphasizing that the franchise
was not a necessary precondition to public political participation
and comparing the gendered assumptions that men and women
30

W iebe, Sdf-Ruk,
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brought to the political arena. These authors imply that the
modem welfare state gradually replaced the older laissez-faire state
at least partly because male political culture lost its monopoly on
formal power. Now that historians have placed political elites in
context alongside diverse masses of cultural contestants, no longer
can political culture history be said to dwell exclusively on "Great
White Men."31
Whether inspired by Elazar's work.i~ political science, or by
Frederick Jac~on Turner's frontier thesis, American historians
have also begun to connect migration patterns with geographical
variations in political culture. Etcheson's Emerging Midwest com
pares the ideologies of southern and northern migrants in ante~
bellum Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Following the trend toward
integration ofboth comparative and diachronic analysis, Etcheson
discusses how the events leading to the Civil War sundered
state-level polities already divided between two regnant political
cultures. Shared ideologies of republicanism, partisanism, and
"westemness" could not withstand the resurgence of sectional
loyalties in the 18 50s. Like Bond, who reconstructed the meaning
of "liberty" and "virtue" for whit~ Mississippians, and Greenberg,
who likened the interpretation o( political culture to "a work of
translation," Etcheson shows a keen sensitivity to language, closely
reading the key terms "private interest" and "public good" in
context. She adds that historians need not dwell on whether
political rhetoric was ever sincere, because, in any case, its users 
were "aware of public sensibilities and community values." In a
democracy, since successful candidates "win office by appealing .
Ketley, "Ideology and Polidcal Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," American Historical
Review, LXXXII (1970), SJI-S62;Jo Freeman, "The Political Culture ofthe Democratic and
Republican Parties," Political Scim« Quattnly, Cl (1986), 327-356; Paula Baker, Tht Moral
FrtiiMWOrlts of Public Lifo: Gmtkr, Politics, and tht St4tt in Rural Ntw York, t87D-19JO (New
York, 1991); Kathryn Kish Sklar, Rorma Kelley and tht Nation 's u.-l : Tht Rise of Women's
Politiall Culturt, tSJD-1900 (New Haven, 1995); Stephanie McCurry, Masters of Small Worlds:
Yeoman Ho~«holds, Geruln Reidtiom, and tht Political Culture of tht Antebellum South Carolina
l....Dw Onmtry (New York, 1995). See also Baker, "The Domestication of Politics: Women and
American Political Society, 178<rt920," American Historical Revitw, LXXXIX (1984), 62<r647.
For other compantive approaches, see Ketley, BaHiing tht Inland Sea: American Political Culture,
Pwblic Policy, arul tht Sacramento Valley, t8jo--t986 (Berkeley, 1989); John D. Buenker, "Sov
ereign Individuals and Organic Networks: Political Cultures in Conflict During the Pr~es
sive Era," American Quattn/y, XL (1988), 187-204; Sklar, "Two Political Cultures in the
Progressive Era: The National Consumers' League and the American ASsociation for Labor
Legjslation," in Linda K. Kerber, Alice Kessler-Harris, and idtm (eds.), U.S. History as Women's
History (Chapel Hill , I99S) .
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to assumptions shared with the electorate," historians can "depend
on politicians to be articulate voices of the political culture,"
regardless of ulterior motives. With these words, Howe and
Baker's pioneering reliance on prominent informants in the study
of political culture now stands vindicated. 32
These impressive new contributions to American historiog
raphy bring political culture to fruition. Yet, not every historian
is satisfied. For example, Lotchin allows that "political culture
seems to be about ideas," but he objects that the concept "fails to
link specific political outcomes to specific attitudes," fretting that
"without outcomes we cannot fully understand politics. ''33
Perhaps the problem is that American historians are offering
ever-thicker descriptions of politics by invoking the term; "po
litical culture," without adequate definition or focus. Sometimes
it seems to denote not political symbols in context but minute
procedural dissections of nominations, campaigns, patronage, and
officeholding. Other times, it seems to encompass "common
assumptions" about everything from "the legitimacy of the politi
cal process in general" tq "the role of government in particular."
Eager proponents have used the concept to investigate diverse
matters, ranging from antebellum literary metaphors and the ori
gins of New Deal liberalism to abolitionist fairs and George
Washington's personality cult. Like political scientists before them,
incautious historians are somewhat in danger of turning political
culture into an indiscriminate uncaused cause once ag.iin.34
32 On migration and political culture, see also Aaron Spencer Fogleman, Ho~l journeys:
Gmnan Immigration, &ttlnnmt, and Politiad Cultu~ in Colonial Amnica, 1717-177j (Phi' delplm,
1996). Bond, Politiad Cultu~ in~ NiMt«nth-Cmtury South, 81-1 14; Greenberg, Honor and
Slavtry (Princeton, 1996), xi; Etcheson, EmDfing Midwnt, xiii. Greenberg and Etcheson
acknowledge a debt to Geenz's theory ofcultural semiotics: See Greenberg. Horror and Slawry,
147-148n, and Etcheson, Emerging Midwnt, 145n. On language and political culture, see also
Andrew R . L. Cayton, ...Language Gives Way to FeelinS'': Rhetoric, Republicanism, and
Religion in Jeffersonian Ohio," in Jeftiey P. Brown and idnn (eds.), The Pursuit of Public
Pown: Politiad Cultanr in Ohio, 1787-1861 (Kent, 1994).
'
33 Roger W. Lotcbin, '"The Political Culture ofthe Merropolitan-Military Complex," Social
Scinta History, XVI (1992), 278-279; idem, book review, jounutl of Amnican History, LXXXII
(1995), U13. See also Paul Goodman, "Putting Some Cbss Back into Political History: 'The
Transfonnation of Political Culture' and the Crisis in American Political History, " .Revkws in
Amnit4m History, XII (1984), 8o-88.
34 Philip R . VanderMeer, The Hoosin PoliticUJn: q[fiaholding and Politiad Cultu~ in Indiana,
t896-1920 (Urbana, 1985); Patrick F. Palermo, "The Rules of the Game: Local Republican
Political Culture," Historian, LXVII (1 98s) , 47~496; Taylor, '" The Art of Hook & S~':
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Certain of political culture's early champions have recanted.
"The need for conceptual clarity is not mere semantics," wrote
Formisano, and Baker complained that, too often, "political cul
ture serves as gloss." The concept appears least promising to those
whose explanatory frameworks privilege class conflict and objec
tive conditions ·over ideology and subjective beliefs. Historians
who prefer "political economy" to political culture, and who are
more likely to invoke Antonio Gramsci than Geertz when they
write about ideology, often accuse political culture historians of
constructing static, univocal models, although they do not neces
sarily hesitate to construct their own in the name of"hegemony. ''35
The concept has failed to ~ring about a paradigm shift becau·se
it has not been able to subsume the conflicts between materialism,
behavioralism, and idealism. Nonetheless, political·culture's antici
pation of the burgeoning "public sphere" literature, in its focus
on publicly negotiated meanings, suggests its continued relevance.
Public-sphere participants couch their arguments in symbols that
are amenable to interpretation by historians who would have- their
Habermas with a grain of Geertz. Political culture also has a place
in the larger movement toward cultural history that Kelley de
scribes as a "phenomenological critique" of behavioralism. 36
Political Culture in Upstate New York During the 17CJ05, "journal of American History, LXXIX
(I99J), IJ7l-IJ96; George C. Rabie, The Confederate Republic: A Revol11tion Against Politics
(Chapel Hill, 1994), J; Anne Norton, Altemativt Amtricas: A Reading of Antebellum Political
Culture (Chicago, 1986); Richard Schneirov, "Political Cultures and the Role of the State in
Labor's Republic: The View from Chicago, 1848-1877," LAbor History, XXXII (1991),
376-400; Lee Chambers-Schiller, "'A Good Work Among the People': The Political Culture
of the Boston Antislavery Fair, " in Jean Yellin, Jean Fagan, and John C. Van Home (eds.),
The Abolitionist Sistnhood: Women's Politit41 Culture in Antebellum AmtJta {Ithaca, 1994); Simon
P. Newman. "Principles or Men? George Washington and the Political Culture of National
Leadership, 1776-1801," joum41 of the Early &public, XII (1994), 477-507.
JS Fonnisano, "Ideology and Political Culture," Amniaan Historical Review, LXXXII (1977),
568; Baker, "And All the Past is Political Culture," 6o; John P. Diggins, "The Misuses of
Gramsci, " jourMI of Amniaan History, LXXV (191\8), 141-145; Peter Burke, "Popular Culture
Recomidered," Storia tkl/4 Storiagrajia, XVII ( 1990), 43-44; James Scott, " False-Consciousness,
or Laying It on Thick, " in Richard M. Merelman (ed.), LAnguage, Symbolism, and Politics
(Boulder, 1992).
36 Craig Calhoun (ed.), Habmruu and the Public Sphnr (Cambridge, Mass., 1992); Donald
R . Kelley, "The Old Cultural History, " History of the Human Sciences, IX (1996), 11 7. See
also David Chaney, The Cultural Tum: Scme-Snting Essays on Contemporary Culture History
(London, 1994). For an example of public-sphere history that resembles political culture
history, see Mary P. Ryan, Women in Public: From Banners to Ballots, J825- 188o (Baltimore,
1990).
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Political c.ulture, as construed in both political science and
history, underscores "the importance ofvalues, feelings, and beliefs
in the explanation of political behavior." Just as the concept drew
political scientists like Rosenbaum into "the underlying psycho
. logical forces that shape much of civic life," it drew historians like
Howe into the "political psychology" of past politics. Verba w~nt
looking not for "what is happening in the world of politics, but
[for] what people believe about those happenings," and he re
cruited historians as well as political scientists in his quest. No
longer must political scientists assume that "culture does not exist
or is not important"; nor must political historians conjure up
"ethnocultures" from mute statistics of behavior. The charge that
the political culture concept tends toward imprecision is not
without merit. Yet, despite its analytical expansiveness, the con
cept represents a valuable check on the assumption that political
scientists and historians are "objective" observersY
One controversial trait has haunted the concept since its
political-~cience origins. "The study of political culture," observed
Dittmer, "has since its beginnings been in the vanguard of the
behavioral revolution in political science." Once Almond and
Verba introduced statistical tables into political culture studies,
everyone followed suit. Ironically, Almond ended up renouncing
the "behavioral revolution," and Verba warned that a ballot was
"a rather blunt instrument" for reconstructing a voter's mentality.
But most of their followers continued reducing politics to quan
tiftable variables. It remained for interpretivist historians to go
where behavioralists in both disciplines feared to tread, combining
cultural semiotics with textual sources. 38 ·
37 Almond, "The Study of Political Culture," in idem (ed.), A Discipline Divided: Schools and
Sects in Political Scim« (Newbury Park, Calif., 1990), 143; Walter A. Rosenbaum, PolitiCJJI
Cultu" (New York, 197S). 4; Howe, "The Evangelical Movement and Political Culture in
the Nonh during the Second Party System,"]ourPUJI ofAmerican History, LXXVII (1991), 1236;
Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," s•6; William Bostock, "The Cultural Explanation
of Politics," Political Scima, XXV (197J), 43; Pye, "Culture and Political Science: Problems
in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture," SocUU Sciena Quartnly, Llll (1972),
28s-296. Culture was such an alien concept in political science that Verba apologized for
using the word at all. See Verba, "Comparative Political Culture, " s 1Jn.
38 Dittmer, "Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synth~."
Wurld Politics, XXIX (1977), ssJ. See also Farr, "Remembering the Revolution: Behavioral
ism in American Political Science," in idmt, John S. Dryzek, and Stephen T . Leonard (eds.),
Political Sciena in History: &~arch Programs and PolitiaJI Traditions (New York, 199S). For a
r.Kiical critique ofbehavioralism, see Timothy W . Luke, "Political Science and the Discourses
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Grad.ually the news filtered back to political scientists that
historians had done well by political culture. Adams excitedly
informed his colleagues that "the non-scientific practitioners of
interpretation have something to say to political scientists about
the task of understanding the place and production of meaning in
politics." He pleaded for cultural semiotics in the study of political
culture: "Political meaning is born not just in what individual
subjects consciously think and value politically, but in cultural.and
intersubjective symbols, in collective meanings inscribed in the
symbolic texts of political practices themselves." Though no fan
of Geertz, Merelman agreed that "if political scientists are to
continue to talk about 'political culture' ... they should attend
to contemporary anthropology. ''39
In the 1 990s, political scientists, like historians, have begun
to look beyond quantitative behavioralism to cultural semiotics.
Brint urges his colleagues to seek "meaning" in politics revealed
not by polls but by "the social and discursive practices of a
culture." They should learn "the cultural grammar or narrative of
a polity-the internal coherence of its social, cultur;U, and discur
sive practices." Elkins echoes historians by defining political cul
ture as "a framework for action rather than a set ofspecific actions
or beliefS. It consists of largely unspoken assumptions about the
world so 'taken for granted' most of the time that they have
become 'second nature."' Learning "cultural grammar" and "un
spoken assumptions" requires textual interpretation informed by
anthropological theory rather than sample surveys or correlation
coefficients. 40
Some political scientists prefer Mary Douglas to Geertz as ·
their anthropologist of choice, but their interpretations of political

of Power: Developing a Genealogy of the Political Culture Coni ept," HiJtory of Pbliti€
Thought, X (1989), US-149· Almond and Stephen Genco, "Ciou~ Ciocks, and the Study
of Politics," in Almond (ed.), A Disdpline Divitkd, p.~s; Verba and Norman H. Nie,
~ ;,. AmtrW: Politiall Dmloaacy ami SocUil 8p44lity (New York, 1972.), ro6. See also
Pye, ..Political Culture Revisited," Politiall Psyclrology, XII (1991), 487-so8.
39 William Adams, "Politics and the Archaeology of Meaning." Westnn Pblitic4/ Qumnly,
XXXIX (1986), S49. S62.; Merelman, "On Culture and Politics in America: A Penpective
&om Structural Anthropology,.. British }otmt4l of Politic41 Scima, XIX (1989), 470. See also
idme, Mlfltirtg Somnlrirtg t/ ~: On Culturr ami Politics in the United States (Berkeley,
1984).
40 Michael Brint, A GmeaiDgy of Politic41 Culturr (Boulder, 1991), 117; David J. Elkins,
M.Mipu~Mion 111111 Omsmt: How Votm 111111 LeaJm ~ Compkxity (Vancouver, 1993), 12.3 .

See also joseph V. Femia, "Political Culture," in William Outhwaite and Tom Bottomore
(eds.), The .8lacJawll Dictionary of Twmtidh-Cmtury SocUil Thought (Oxford, 1993), 47S-477·
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action are couched in language that . participants would have
difficulty understanding. Other political scientists follow historians
in adopting Geertz's less structuralist approach precisely because
ofits intelligibility. From this camp, Laitin counsels that "historical
(contextual) analysis," combined with a "richer notion of culture,
one built upon the Geertzian framework," is the key to political
culture· research. 41
A recent survey of the field by Welch, a British political
scientist, n~tes approvingly that "political culture as used and
developed within American historiography has begun to fulfill
some of the promise of a phenomenological approach." Welch
appreciates .historians because "a researcher investigating the past
with the tool ofpolitical culture is much less constrained than one
investigating it with a view to justifying this or that theory of
comparative politics." The problem, he reali~es, is that "the em
pirical bounty offered by the attitude survey has encouraged
behavioral political scientists to imagine they have the fullest
conception of political culture, and has distracted them from the
more fertile modes of inquiry to which historians have perforce
been led." Welch admires how American historians escaped "the
necessity of choosing between interests and culture as explana
tions, instead using political culture to transcend that dichotomy."
No longer need students ofpolitics argue about the relative weight
of ideas, interests, and behavior; political culture is the context of
politics itself-the structure of meaning through which political
participants develop ideas, perceive interests, and act on both.
Political culture, as applied by historians, provides "a means of
connecting the analyst's thick description with the self-under
standings of the participants," and this connection is what com
parative politics has always lacked. 42

41 Laitin, "The Civic Culture at 30," American PoliticAl Scima R.Mnu, LXXXIX (1995),
171-173. For Douglas foUowen, sec M . Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, Cultural Theory;
Ellis, AmrritAn PoliticiJI Cultum; and Dennis J. Coyle and Ellis, Politics, Policy, and Cultu'rt
(Boulder, 1994). For Geenz foUowen, sec Dittmer, ..Political Culture and Political Symbol
ism"; Adams, ..Politics and the Archaeology of Meaning"; and Paul Nesbitt-Larking, "Meth
odological Notes on the Study of Political Culture," PoliticAl Psychology, XIII (1992), 79-9Z.
42 Welch. TM CDrtapt of Politiall Culturt, 13, 148, IS7- JS8. See also Richard W. Wilson,
Complitln« Jtkologin: Rnltinlting Politiall Culturt (New York. 1992); David Brian Robett~tn•
..Politics and the Past: History, Behavioralism, and the Return to Institutionalism in American
Political Science," in Eric H . Monkk.onen (ed.), Engaging the Past: The USt's of History Across
tlu Social Scimas (Durham, 1994).
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When political culture was still in its conceptual infancy
within political science, Hitchner argued that it should be nour
ished with historical analysis, not survey data. Political culture
· offered great analytical potential, but if the "methodological in
clination" to rely solely on supposedly "scientific" data persisted,
"we ?re headed for some trouble." Hitchner wanted his colleagues
to become historians of the political cultures that they studied. He
believed that "to discard the ever important dimension of history
is truly to cut us adrift from reality. There is a wisdom in our past
to which we must always listen." Historians, not political scientists,
turned out to be the better listeners. Indeed, many political sci
entists-using the political culture concept still rely on poll data,
but, among historians, cultural (or "public sphere") approaches are
gradually supplanting quantitative behavioralism. "We have not
begun to understand our political history sufficiently," Levine
recently admonished, "because we too frequently artificially sepa
rated it from the larger cultural context of which it was a part."
Perhaps that artificial separation has ended. "Historiographically,"
acknowledges Silbey, a prominent behavioralist, "we live in an
age of political culture. "4J
43 Dell G. Hitchner, ..Political Science and Political Culture," Western PolitiCJII Quarterly,
XXI (1968), 552; Lawrence W. Levine, The Unpredictable Past: Explorations in American Cultural
History (New York, 1994), 12; Silbey, ..Conclusion," 129.

